engleză
The problem is, valid but incompatible service theories of operational warfighting inhibit rather than promote jointness. One cause of this problem is the joint definition of the center of gravity, which is vague and ineffective. This monograph tests a possible solution by asking, should the United States Armed Forces adopt the unified center of gravity framework proposed by Dr. Joe Strange as an element of operational design? The hypothesis is: the framework reconciles the service theories of operational warfighting while preserving their core principles and is an effective analytical tool to achieve success in full spectrum operations. By modifying the definition of critical vulnerability, the framework was consistent with the service theories of operational art, maneuver-warfare, air warfare, and naval warfare. It was an effective analytical tool to achieve success in Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, and Joint Guardian. Therefore, the United States Armed Forces should adopt the modified center of gravity framework as an element of operational design. It is the nucleus of a unified theory of joint warfighting that resolves the paradox of valid but incompatible service theories to achieve unified action in operational design.
