Peste 4 milioane de titluri în engleză și alte limbi! Descoperă-ți noua poveste astăzi!

Power by Design

Name: Power by Design
Brand: University of Hawai'i Press
SKU: 9780824817213
Price: 175.52 RON
Availability: InStock

Constitution-making in Nationalist China

Autor: Suisheng Zhao

Limbă:

Legare: Copertă tare

Editura: University of Hawai'i Press

Disponibilitate: șansă 50%

Şanse de a obține acest titlu

175.52 lei

First established as a cabinet system in Guangzhou in 1925, the Nationalist Government of China was...

Informații despre carte

Autor

Suisheng Zhao

Limbă

engleză

Legare

Carte - Copertă tare

Publicat

1996

Pagini

232

EAN

9780824817213

ISBN

9780824817213

Enbook ID

06366035

Editura

University of Hawai'i Press

Greutate

380

Dimensiuni

147 x 217 x 19

Descriere completă

First established as a cabinet system in Guangzhou in 1925, the Nationalist Government of China was replaced three years later by a presidential system under a unified Nationalist government in Nanjing. The cabinet government was restored in 1931 and existed until the presidential system was again installed by the 1936 constitution. Why did presidential and cabinet systems exist alternately during this formative period of the Nationalist government? Why was the presidential system finally adopted in 1936? Suisheng Zhao answers these and other questions fundamental to understanding authoritarian regimes in this pioneering study of the design of the Nationalist Government of China from 1925 to 1937. Borrowing ideas from public choice theory, Zhao proposes that political actors who design governmental institutions are driven by power-maximization strategies just as business firms are driven by wealth-maximization strategies. Constitution-making reflects the underlying distribution of power among authoritarian leaders, who attempt to design political institutions that will consolidate their personal power and position. Thus, Zhao argues, if political actors possess more power resources than their rivals and anticipate themselves becoming dominant, they will choose the singular leadership of the presidential system. If they are in a weaker position and do not anticipate becoming dominant, they will prefer the collective leadership of the cabinet form of government.