Peste 4 milioane de titluri în engleză și alte limbi! Descoperă-ți noua poveste astăzi!

Află starea comenzii

Contactați-ne

Collective Rationality

Equilibrium in Cooperative Games

Autor: Paul Weirich

Limbă:

Legare: Carte broșată

Editura: Oxford University Press Inc

Disponibilitate: În depozitul extern

Expediem în 10-18 zile

234.71 lei

Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. A committee may sensibly...

Informații despre carte

Autor

Paul Weirich

Limbă

engleză

Legare

Carte - Carte broșată

Publicat

2012

Pagini

284

EAN

9780199929016

ISBN

0199929017

Enbook ID

04536780

Editura

Oxford University Press Inc

Greutate

430

Dimensiuni

232 x 156 x 19

Descriere completă

Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. A committee may sensibly award fellowships, or may irrationally award them in violation of its own policies. A theory of collective rationality defines collective acts that are evaluable for rationality and formulates principles for their evaluation. This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control. It also argues that such an act is collectively rational if the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where conditions are ideal for joint action and agents have rationally prepared for joint action. The people engaged in a game of strategy form a group, and the combination of their acts yields a collective act. If their collective act is rational, it constitutes a solution to their game. A theory of collective rationality yields principles concerning solutions to games. One principle requires that a solution constitute an equilibrium among the incentives of the agents in the game. In a cooperative game some agents are coalitions of individuals, and it may be impossible for all agents to pursue all incentives. Because rationality is attainable, the appropriate equilibrium standard for cooperative games requires that agents pursue only incentives that provide sufficient reasons to act. The book's theory of collective rationality supports an attainable equilibrium-standard for solutions to cooperative games and shows that its realization follows from individuals' rational acts. By extending the theory of rationality to groups, this book reveals the characteristics that make an act evaluable for rationality and the way rationality's evaluation of an act responds to the type of control its agent exercises over the act. The book's theory of collective rationality contributes to philosophical projects such as contractarian ethics and to practical projects such as the design of social institutions.

Cele mai căutate

Categories

Authors

Publishers

Produse

Produse

Cele mai căutate

Categories

Authors

Publishers

Produse

Produse

Collective Rationality

Equilibrium in Cooperative Games

Informații despre carte

Descriere completă

S-ar putea să te intereseze

Clienții care au cumpărat această carte au mai cumpărat și